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In th.e Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
I<IMBALL ELEVATOR COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

\ Case No. 8066

ELEVATOR SUPPLIES COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

RESPONDENT DOES NOT CONTROVERT
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rule 75 (p) ( 2) specifies: (tlf the respondent agrees with
the statement of facts set forth in appellant's brief, he shall
so indicate. If he controverts it, he shall state wherein such
statement is inconsistent with the facts and he shall make a
statement of facts as he finds them, giving reference to the
places of the record supporting his statement and controverting
appellant's statement.''
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Plaintiff and respondent does not point out wherein a
single statement in the Brief of Appellant is inaccurate or
unsupported by the record. Nor does the respondent refute
the argun1ent and citations of authority in the Brief of Appellant which show that the trial court committed prejudicial
error. For the most part, the respondent attempts to side-step
and ignore the admissions made by plaintiff at the trial which
precluded the possibility of any contract whatsoever with defendant, and which admissions demonstrated that plaintiff as
unsuccessful bidder made outrageous claims which are wholly
repugnant to law.
Some authorities cited by respondent have no application
to the actual facts of this case. Other citations support the contentions of the appellant and do not sustain the claims of respondent.

RESPONDENT MISSTATES THE FACTS
The initial sentence in the Brief of Respondent is typical
of the misstatements of fact and misleading argument which
characterize said brief: ((This is an action between an elevator
company and an elevator parts supplier."
Plaintiff did not sue defendant on any pretense that there
was any subsisting contract to supply plaintiff anything. The
trial court permitted plaintiff to recover for not being awarded
a contract with Hotel Utah (R. 194). The amended complaint
alleged an express oral agreement whereby defendant pur·
portedly ((agreed" to submit to Utah Hotel Company a t(sup-

4
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porting bid" in a sum $18,000 or $19,000 in excess of plaintiff's
bid, and ((violation" of such ((agreement" by submission of a
firm bid instead and acceptance of an _award of a contract
(R. 34-41). The theory was changed at the trial to nan implied
agreement not to compete" with plaintiff, although competition was never specifically discussed (R. 632, 651).
Respondent's statement of ((The Facts" on pages 2 to
26 of its brief, omits nearly all of the material facts. Such
statement distorts the written instruments, particular! y the
numerous written offers which were never accepted and which
expired. Respondent even contradicts the stipulations of fact
and its own admissions by misstatement of the record. Most
of the ((evidence" recited was inadmissible. Respondent ignores the fact that it gave defendant very little business, and
that respondent did most of its business with other companies.
The fact that defendant also did most of its business with
other companies is disregarded by respondent. Likewise, the
respondent fails to mention that from and after 1948 the
Utah Hotel Company was the customer of the defendant, not
the customer of plaintiff. To avoid needless repetition, some
of the misstatements and distortions by respondent are mentioned in replying to the argument of ((Respondent's Positions."

STATEMENT OF POINTS FOR REPLY TO
((RESPONDENT'S POSITIONS"
1. There is no factual basis for the contention that ((There

was an agreement not to compete."

5
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2. If an agreement had been made to restrain defendant

from submitting a bid to the owner of a building, such agreement would not have come under any exception to the antitrust acts.
3. There was no legal consideration to support an "implied agreement'' of any kind.
4. Plaintiff recognized the right of Utah Hotel Company
to obtain a firm bid from defendant.
5. There was no basis for an award of any damages.
6. The trial was unfair and prejudicial to defendant.

ARGUMENT
Point I
THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE CONTENTION THAT ((THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT NOT TO
COMPETE.''
Plaintiff knows that it could not possibly argue into existence from the negotiations relating to Hotel Utah any "implied agreement'' whereby defendant would be restrained
from giving the hotel a bona fide bid, for the hotel was then
a customer of defendant. Plaintiff had no contract with defendant of any nature or description. Plaintiff admitted that it knew
the hotel wanted a bid from defendant, and that plaintiff told
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company that it was all right
for Pacific to submit a bid to defendant, knowing that defendant would use such bid (if reasonable) in computing its own

6
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bid for submission to Utah Hotel Company (R. 374-375, 573,
575). Plaintiff also admitted through its general manager that
defendant made no promises (R. 589-590).
Plaintiff tries to reach back into fruitless negotiations of
years past for an argument about an ((implied argreement"
which could not be spelled out from any competent evidence.
Plaintiff relies on considerable inadmissible evidence.

Such

evidence not being helpful, plaintiff resorts to contradictions
of the record and palpable misstatements of fact in an effort
to argue into existence an ((implied agreement" out of unaccepted offers and other negotiations in the past which resulted in no contracts. The misstatements of fact in the argument of respondent are shocking, and they show that the respondent cannot hope to sustain the unjust judgment by
adherence to the basic facts.
Plaintiff carefully refrains from mentioning any of the
following facts which were either stipulated at the trial, established by admissions of plaintiff, or from other undisputed
evidence including written documents: (a) Plaintiff, except for
occasional purchases of replacement parts by catalog number,
obtained numerous detailed written bids from defendant, but
in a period of 2 3 years plaintiff actually accepted only 7 of
the offers, and one of the 7 contracts was later canceled
(Exhibit 46).

The five contracts since 1931 have been small

jobs. (b) Although repeatedly getting bids from defendant,
plaintiff never at any time purchased from defendant any
dumb-waiter elevators, elevator controls or related equipment.
Such items have been purchased from Pacific Elevator and
Equipment Company, from Energy Company, and other firms.
7
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(c) Just as most of plaintiff's business has been awarded to
other companies, particularly with respect to equipment of
any size, most of defendant's business has been awarded to it
by companies other than plaintiff. (d) Excluding the passenger
elevator projects and the dumb-waiter projects at Hotel Utah,
by 1950 the plaintiff had ceased to even request the defendant
to submit a bid for any substantial part of an elevator modernization project, as plaintiff had become the territorial representative of Pacific. (e) From and after February 1948, Utah
Hotel Company was the customer of the defendant, not the
customer of plaintiff. (R. 243-244, Exhibit 3, R. 415, 461, 480,
482, 503, 505, 520-521, 847, 858-859).
In the teeth of the foregoing facts summarized from the
Brief of Appellant, plaintiff attempts to argue that there was
some kind of nebulous ctimplied agreement" which precluded
defendant from entering into a binding contract with defendant's own customer, Utah Hotel Company. Plaintiff cites no
authority to support its absurd contentions. As pointed out
hereinafter, some of the cases cited by plaintiff show that defendant acted entirely within its rights.
As part of a misleading argument, on page 3 and on page
26 of the Brief of Respondent, plaintiff attempts to picture
itself as an ((original contractor" and the defendant as a mere
((supplier as its very name designates it to be." Thus, plaintiff
makes the absurd atten1pt to restrict and curtail the corporate
powers and operations of defendant to that of a ««supplier"
because of the name, ((Elevator Supplies Company, Inc." Of
course, plaintiff cites no authority for such untenable argument.
The fact is that plaintiff itself never acted as an original con8
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tractor on any new construction, and at no tit?e did plaintiff
act as an original contractor except in the specific instances
where plaintiff was awarded a contract by the building owners.
Of the numerous projects on which plaintiff became an original
contractor, in only 6 instances did any contractual relationship
arise between plaintiff and defendant. The only one of any
consequence was a subcontract awarded to defendant on Hotel
Utah 24 years ago. The other five were only small contracts,
and they did not begin to encompass the various types of
equipment manufactured and sold by defendant.
The declaration of respondent on page 26 that ((through
a long course of business dealings the defendant established
itself as a supplier and the plaintiff as an original contractor,"
is patently false. From 1931 to 1950 the defendant supplied
plaintiff only a few times. Except for some occasional purchases of replacement parts from defendant by catalog number, (which could not be procured from some other company),
the plaintiff always requested the defendant to submit written
bids on some particular portion of a specific project on which
plaintiff wanted a price quotation (R. 461). During said entire
20 year period ending August 1950!' out of the numerous
bids plaintiff procured from defendant, plaintiff awarded only
5 contracts other than the one which was cancelled. Each
of the 5 contracts was relatively small, and except for 1 of
them, each was a contract which called for materials to be
installed; so that even as to the few items covered by contracts,
defendant was not a mere supplier as plaintiff has pictured
defendant to be, but a subcontractor. The contention that defendant was merely a ((supplier as its very name designates it
to be," is a myth.

9
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Plaintiff purchased very little from defendant.

In fact,

plaintiff purchased most of its equipment from companies
other than defendant. Plaintiff admitted that defendant did
not quote and sell exclusively to plaintiff (R. 846, 856-858).
Contrary to the assertions that plaintiff purchased control
equipment from defendant, at no time did plaintiff ever issue
a purchase order for any control equipment (R. ~80-482).
Plaintiff generally purchased fr9m companies other than defendant, the type of equipment which performed the same
functions as equipment manufactured by defendant (R. 486,
510-518) . On page 5 of the Brief of Respondent a claim is
made which contradicts the express admissions of plaintiff:
nAt no time did the plaintiff company receive or
request quotations on systems competitive to that furnished by the defendant (R. 302-303) ."
By the simple expedient of denying that the equipment
purchased by plaintiff from other manufacturers was not ((competitive," the plaintiff attempts to make it appear that it was
dealing exclusively with defendant, when most of the equipment plait~.tiff purchased, whether on an installed or uninstalled
basis, was purchased from companies other than defendant.
Inasmuch as ttsynchron control" is a trade-name of one type
of relay control manufactured by defendant, plaintiff's pious
declaration that it never asked a competitor of defendant to
quote on such materials, begs the question. It is like saying
that plaintiff never purchased a Chevrolet or offered to purchase
such particular make of automobile from Ford Motor Company.
Control equipment is of various makes and manufacture, all
designed to perform certain definite functions.

10
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The record shows conclusively that time after time the
plaintiff requested quotations from defendant on dumb-waiter
elevators, but in each instance where plaintiff became the
original contractor the plaintiff purchased such type of equipment from companies other than defendant (R. 503, 505, 874,
948-949). Exhibit 14, a letter from plaintiff to defendant in
June 1950, admits that plaintiff purchased such equipment
from another company. Exhibits 32, -3,9, 41 and 46 show that
companies other than plaintiff purchased from defendant dumbwaiter elevators.
Contrary to the contention of respondent on pages 26
to 27 of its brief that nit was uniform practice for the plaintiff
to submit specifications on a job to the defendant and request
quotations on elevator materials f. o. b. or on control systems
installed at the job site," the exhibits introduced by plaintiff
show that in 1950 (except on the Hotel Utah projects) the
plaintiff limited its requests for defendant to bid to small items
only. The plaintiff did not even request any bid on control
systems in 1950 on the Charleston Apartments, Congress Hotel,
University Heights Apartments, and Deseret News Building.
The plaintiff as representative of Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company requested quotations on the control systems
from Pacific, not from defendant (R. 510-518).
On the Park Building job in 1949, plaintiff asked defendant
to bid on the relay controls as well as other equipment to
Murphy Elevator Company. In 1950 plaintiff asked for a
direct bid which defendant submitted. Later on, plaintiff requested defendant to submit a bid on only a very small portion
of the job, excluding entirely the controls. The plaintiff
11
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awarded a contract for the controls to Pacific Elevator and
Equipment Company (R. 510-518).
The argument on page 28 of the Brief of Appellant is
contrary to the facts:
((The· parties to this action were never competitors
nor did they ever deal at arm's length. The plaintiff was
selling the defendant's supplies and control systems and
it was incumbent upon plaintiff to deal with the defendant after the plaintiff had· urged the customer to
use defendant's system and after plaintiff made its
bid based upon quot ations received from the defendant.''
The plaintiff was not selling defendant's supplies. Plaintiff
was neither the agent nor territorial representative of defendant.
On the other hand plaintiff was territorial representative of
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, which manufactured
and sold equipment which performed the same functions as
equipment manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff finally admitted at the trial that it purchased from others the. type of
equipment manufactured and sold by defendant (R. 505).
Plaintiff certainly was not urging any building owner to use
defendant's equipment, when plaintiff was not even taking a
bid from defendant on most of the equipment manufactured
by defendant, but on the other hand was taking bids from
and issuing purchase orders to Pacific Elevator and Equipment
Company. Such was the situation in 1950.
Plaintiff furnished no specifications on Hotel Utah. It was
not the plaintiff that had defendant's materials specified on
that job. The defendant had been contracting with Utah Hotel

12
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Company since February 1948, and it was the management
of the hotel which specified defendant's equipment. On page
19 of the Brief of Respondent it is stated that when Hotel Utah
informed the plaintiff that the hotel wanted a bid frotn defendant, Mr. Connole of Kimball suggested Westinghouse
Electric Company. Since Westinghouse would not likely quote
on defendant's equipment, there is no substance to the pretense that plaintiff was trying to sell defendant's equipment.
Plaintiff knew that the hotel wanted defendant's equipment
used as far as possible, and the attempt to discourage the hotel
from getting a bid from defendant and to induce the hotel
to get a bid from Westinghouse, refute the claim that plaintiff
was trying to sell defendant's equipment.
The plaintiff attempts to make it appear that plaintiff
was responsible for having defendant's equipment specified
in the Medical Arts Building, which defendant ultimately
installed under a contract with Murphy Elevator Company.
However, Alma J. Janke, plaintiff's own witness, testified that
it was on his own recommendation that Elevator Supplies
control equipment was specified on the job, following various
conversations with Roy C. Smjth and after making an inspection trip to defendant's plant. Mr. Janke, who was formerly
an employee of Otis Elevator Company, knew that Otis manufactured equipment which performed similar functions (R.
452, 454).
On page 11 of its brief, respondent states that in 1949
defendant submitted a proposal on an elevator project at
the Pioneer Memorail Building. Plaintiff fails to mention that
defendant submitted an identical bid to Elevator Service and

13
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Supply Company of Salt Lake City, and that it was not the
plaintiff, but Elevator Service and Supply Company which
awarded the contract to defendant.
On page 12 plaintiff states that Mr. Connole of Kimball
and Mr. Smith of Elevator Supplies Co., Inc., went together
to the Dooley Building in 1948, and that defendant furnished
plaintiff cuts and illustrative material. Plaintiff neglects to mention that defendant furnished the same information to other
companies, including Elevator Service and Supply Company
and the Montgomery Elevator Co. On page 27 respondent
further states:
(( ... Frequently representatives of the parties would
consult and collaborate on specifications and designs
most suitable for the customer. On many occasions representatives of both parties ·would jointly confer with
a customer or building owners and thereafter-based
upon quotations made by the defendant to the plaintiff
-plaintiff would bid the overall and complete job .. "
The statement is highly misleading. The defendant also
went to building owners with representatives of other elevator
companies. Defendant was interested in selling its own equipment, and also to ascertain how its equipment could be synchronized with equipmept which would remain or with equipment
which might be installed by others. Plaintiff could cite only 3
instances where defendant's representative ever went to a
building owner with plaintiff's representative. One was the
Medical Arts Building in 1947, on which defendant was
ultimately awarded a contract by Murphy Elevator Company.
Another was the Dooly Building in 1948 which defendant
bid to two different companies although never awarded any

14
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contract, and the other was the Continental Bank Building in
1949. The statement on page 13 to the effect that defendant
participated with plaintiff and Pacific in the preparation of
"an engineer's estimate" is wholly unsupported by the record
(R. 343). Mr. Connole represented to defendant that the Continental Bank Building management wanted a bid on the
project, and after plaintiff twice procured bids from defendant
which defendant prepared at considerable expense to defendant,
the plaintiff did not even bother to submit a bid to Continental
Bank Building management (R. 475-477).
Plaintiff argues that defendant ((worked with'' plaintiff
to "get business together." The implic~tion is that plaintiff
always purchased from defendant, which is contrary to the
admitted facts. Plaintiff admitted that it purchased similar
equipment from other companies (R. 503, 505) . Likewise,
plaintiff admitted that defendant did not quote and sell exclusively to the plaintiff (R. 846, 856-858). On pages 6 to
16 of the Brief of Respondent, reference is made to numerous
requests for bids and submission of bids, only one of which
was ever accepted by plaintiff. The one contract which came
into being was later cancelled. In more than 20 years the
plaintiff accepted only 7 offers out of the multitude of offers
procured from defendant. Through a long course of getting
bids from defendant, with few exceptions, plaintiff awarded
contracts to other companies. Of the total of 6 contracts which
were awarded to defendant, each one was in utmost detail,
and not one contained any covenant that defendant would
either deal with the plaintiff in the future. or refrain frotn dealing with a particular person or group of persons.

15
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The contract on the Walker Bank Building awarded to
defendant by plaintiff was cancelled at the request of plaintiff.
On page 9 of its brief respondent makes the following claim
with respect thereto: tCPlaintiff protected the defendant on
the job by insisting that as a condition to the cancellation the
defendant be awarded the supply of electrical power door
operators (R. 356) ." Such assertion is not a fair statement
of the competent evidence. The defendant had a binding contract with plaintiff, and such contract could not be cancelled
without consent of defendant. Defendant obtained $2,000
from the building management as the maximum amount
plaintiff would have to pay defendant for cancellation. Plaintiff paid only $1,000 to defendant which certainly did not
((protect" defendant when it had incurred expenses of $2,000

(R. 43 5-440). Furthermore, plaintiff had nothing to do with
defendant's submission of a bid to Otis Elevator Company
on- the furnishing and installation of door operating mechanisms. Otis asked defendant for a bid because the Otis equipment would not fit into the openings (R. 870). If Otis could
have made its own equipment work, it would not have asked
defendant to install any of defendant's equipment. The case
illustrates the fact that defendant treated all elevator companies alike by allowing a discount of 10% from list price.
On page 29 plaintiff states in defiance of all rules of
contract, and contrary to the evidence:
The defendant through its long course of
dealings merely promised it would not quote direct to
a building management where plaintiff had requested
a quotation from the defendant and plaintiff had there·
after submitted a bid to the building management."
(c

•

•

•
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Never at any time did plaintiff impose any such restriction
in any request for bid, and notwithstanding the defendant
went into the most minute detail in submitting a written bid
to plaintiff as well as to other companies, the subject of refraining from competition is not mentioned in any bid submitted
either to plaintiff, to Murphy, Montgomery, Elevator Service
and Supply Con1pany, or any other company. Furthermore,
plaintiff disregards the fact that there could be no contract
when there was an unaccepted offer. When we examine the
six contracts which plaintiff actually awarded, each one relates to a specifiic project and there is no covenant to transact
any business on some other project nor to refrain from dealing
with the owner. What plaintiff still seeks to do is to create a
fictitious ((implied agreement" out of a series of unaccepted
offers and other fruitless negotiations which came to naught.
Plaintiff says in effect that the failure of defendant in one
instance or a s_eries of instances to submit a bid direct! y to
the owner of the building implied a negative promise to refrain in the future from submitting any bid to a building
owner. The argument is absurd.
In this case, Utah Hotel Company had been the customer
of defendant since February 1948. Defendant was an original
cont,ractor from 1948 to 1950 on the sale and delivery of
repair equipment (R. 243-244, 770-771, 779-782). Nevertheless, in contradiction of the testimony of its witness Max C.
Carpenter, plaintiff repeatedly makes the unfounded statement
that prior to September 27, 1950, defendant had not acted as
an original contractor in Utah. Even if plaintiff had been right
instead of wrong, it would have been entirely immaterial, for
17
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the defendant had the absolute right to change its own policy
and begin to operate as an original contractor at any time.
Certainly the defendant did not have to consult plaintiff nor
any other elevator company. Plaintiff infers that once having
acted as a subcontractor for plaintiff on some project, defendant
thereafter could not operate on some other project as an
original contractor. The plaintiff cites no authority for such
a concept as it is contrary to every fundamental rule of freedom
of contract.
Plaintiff seeks to obscure the fact that plaintiff obtained
its bid from defendant on Hotel Utah dated June 14, 1950,
by falsely representing that the hotel was awarding the job
to plaintiff. Plaintiff neglects to mention, of course, that such
bid obtained by deceit was never accepetd and never resulted
in a binding contract whatsoever, and that said bid was withdrawn by letter dated September 8, 1950, after plaintiff's bid
was rejected by Utah Hotel Company. After the defendant submitted a new bid to plaintiff following submission
of a bid to Utah Hotel Company, ~nd after Pacific submitted
its revised bid to plaintiff on September 15, 1950, the plaintiff
did not even bother to sub1nit a new bid to Utah Hotel Company.
In September 1950 plaintiff was in the same position as if it
had never submitted a bid at all.
On page 26 of the Brief of Respondent it is admitted
that officials of Hotel Utah nwere openly antagonistic to the
plaintiff's cause," but plaintiff contends that nprior to the
filing of the lawsuit the plaintiff enjoyed a very good business
relationship with the Hotel Utah and with its personnel." The
record refutes the last quoted statement, for the hotel ceased
18
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to do business with plaintiff back in February 1948 due to
dissatisfaction over a small service elevator installed by plaintiff
which had to be removed, and also due to failure of plaintiff
to give the hotel good service. The business relation between
plaintiff and the hotel went down to zero. Beginning in February 1948 the hotel contracted direct with defendant, and
the hotel was the customer of defendant (not the customer of
plaintiff) thereafter. When Kimball submitted its incomplete
bid dated August 16, 1950, to Utah Hotel Company, the hotel
not only rejected such bid which omitted 15 essential items,

but the hotel refused to even entertain any further bid from
plaintiff (R. 263-264, 822).
Plaintiff never accepted any offer it obtained from defendant on Hotel Utah. In fact Mr. Connole testified that
Kimball never accepted a proposal from a proposed contractor
until or unless Kimball was awarded the contract (R. 43 5) .
Plaintiff furnished defendant no specifications on the hotel
elevator modernization or dumb-waiter elevator installation
projects. The plaintiff had no contract, express or implied.
It is stated on page 20 that Mr. Henker of Pacific testified
that he thought the hotel management wanted a ((check bid,
and naturally it was going to be higher." Reference to said
incompetent statement is disposed of by his admission on
cross-examination that he came to Salt Lake City for the purpose of making a detailed investigation of the project for
the purpose of submitting to defendant a firm bid (R. 676,
716-718). Pacific not only submitted a firm bid on September
7, 1950, but it accepted a purchase order from defendant.

The plaintiff ignores the fundamental rule that the testimony
19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of a witness zs no stronger than where it ts left on crossexamination.
Plaintiff relies on incompetent evidence of Mr. Connole
who contradicted the terms and provisions of Exhibit "I"
dated August 16, 1950, by saying that said bid included all
of the work stated in defendant's bid except the drive sheaves.
At least 15 items essential to the job were omitted. Utah Hotel
Company did not regard the bid as satisfactory, and it had
the unquestioned legal right to reject that bid, which it did on
August 17, 1950, before it called upon defendant to submit
a bid on the overall job (R. 246-247, 263-264, 787-788).
Plaintiff never bothered to submit any further bid to the hotel
although both Pacific and defendant submitted new bids early
in September 1950 in the light of conditions which they learned
from the hotel management (R. 542).
Since the bid dated September 12, 1950, to plaintiff (Exhibit LLL) was submitted to plaintiff by defendant after
defendant had already submitted a bid on the overall projects
to the hotel (Exhibits J and 4), the argument of plaintiff
that defendant impliedly promised not to give a bid to the
building owner is absurd. It is impossible to imply something
which contradicts the known facts. The text quoted from by
plaintiff on pages 27 and 28 does not hold that a contract can
be implied from an unaccepted offer, nor a promise implied
which contradicts the facts. There ·is no competent evidence
of any agreement.
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Point 2
IF AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MADE TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANT FROM SUBMITTING A BID TO
THE OWNER OF A BUILDING, SUCH AGREEMENT
WOULD NOT HAVE COME UNDER ANY EXCEPTION
TO THE ANTI-TRUST ACTS.
On pages 28 and 29 of the Brief of Respondent it 1s
argued:
c]t is neither the intent nor purpose of the Sherman
Act or the Clayton Act to nullify or abolish agreements
necessarily made in the ordinary and regular channels
of trade ... "
First of all, there was no agreement at all, as plaintiff
failed to accept any offer made by defendant to plaintiff with
respect to Hotel Utah in 1950. In the second place, an agreement
to refrain from submitting an honest bid to the owner of a
building could not possibly be an agreement ((necessarily made
in the ordinary and regular channels of trade,'' for there is
no trade if there is no contract, and without acceptance of an
offer to sell there is no contract. Plaintiff also makes the following specious contention:
(( . . . The plaintiff, without such an understanding,
would find itself in the anamalous and always risky
position of seeking quotations from the defendant,
then attempting to compete on a price to the customer.
American free enterprise would suffer, if such were
the law."
American free enterprise does not countenance agreements whereby a manufacturer and a prospective occasional
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purchaser agree that the manufacturer shall refrain from selling
to any particular person or to any group of persons. American
free enterprise would be destroyed if the owner of property
could not get a bona fide offer from a responsible firm which
it has patronized for over two years. The idea that a property
owner cannot sell to his own customer is not free enterprise.
It is anything but ((free enterprise" if the owner cannot get
a competitive bid on the same type of equipment and materials
the owner specifies. The"'Other companies with which defendant
did most of its business made no such specious claim as
plaintiff makes.
Defendant went as far as it could legitimately go in
allowing all elevator companies a uniform discount from
list price of 10%, since the building owner could not get such
a discount. The plaintiff infers that a party is never safe in
bidding if the manufacturer underbids. Such is not the case
here, as the defendant did not give Utah Hotel Company a
lower bid, but defendant gave the plaintiff a lower bid by
offering plaintiff the usual elevator company discount, but
such discount was not offered to.Utah Hotel Company.
Plaintiff has the audacity to say that the ccagreement"
which it tries to argue into existence would not tend to a restraint of trade or monopoly. The very nature of such agreement is to restrain the owner from getting a bona fide bid and
would not only tend toward monopoly, but it would be a
criminal offense as a conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
All the way through its argument, plaintiff ignores the
fact that Utah Hotel Company was the customer of defendant,
not the customer of plaintiff; and that upon the withdrawal of
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defendant's original offer of June 14, 1950, the parties were
in the same position as if no offer had been made, for at that
time plaintiff's bid to the hotel had been rejected. Defendant
did not submit its new offer to plaintiff (also subject to the
elevator company discount of 10%) until after defendant had
submitted its bona fide offer on the entire project to Hotel Utah
at the request of the hotel company. Since the defendant had

already given the hotel a bona fide offer, there could not
possibly have been any rrimplied promiseJJ on the part of
defendant to refrain from giving the hotel a bona fide bid.
Of the various cases and texts cited by plaintiff in its
brief, not one of them states that defendant did not have
the right to do just exactly what defendant did in this case.
Not a single case is offered to show that the submission of
a bid to a prospective original contractor {(implies an agreement to refrain from submitting a bid direct! y to the owner."
No case can be found, for such contention is utterly contrary
to law. The case of Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Derby Mfg. Co.,
94 Conn. 311, 109 A. 395, on which the trial court held defendant was precluded from submitting a bid to Utah Hotel
Company is clearly not in point; for that case involved a bailment of plaintiff's goods. The court in that case held in effect
that since the plaintiff furnished defendant the copper from
which the defendant agreed to manufacture copper bands for
plaintiff under an express written contract defendant could
not bid against plaintiff with respect to such bailments of
plaintiff's property.
This case did not involve any materials of plaintiff. The
plaintiff did not furnish defendant anything. The defendant
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was using its own materials. Contrary to the assertions of
plaintiff, plaintiff did not furnish any specifications. The other
cases cited by plaintiff in its brief refute the contentions of
plaintiff. As pointed out in Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros. Clark Co., 263, U. S. 564, 44 S. Ct. 162, 68 L. Ed.
448, 30 A. L. R. 1114, cited by respondent at page 32, a wholesaler may stop dealing with a manufacturer if he does not
like the manufacturer's policies or if t'the thinks such manufacturer is undermining his trade by selling either to a competitive wholesaler or to a retailer competing with his own
customers." The same case holds that if one of them does
an act which would be lawful in and of itself, it might become
a conspiracy prohibited by law ttif the result be hurtful to
the public or the individual against whom the concerted action
is directed.''
The rule cited by plaintiff in 36 Am. Jur. at 504 refutes
the contention of plaintiff, for it holds that where a person is
not bound by contract (and certainly the defendant was not
bound by contract to plaintiff when plaintiff failed and neglected to accept any of it offers) , he might refuse to sell his
property to any other person (such as plaintiff), ttand any
loss or injury thereby inflicted upon the other person is damnem
absqu injuria, and gives rise to no legal liability."
The cases cited by plaintiff to the effect that a restraint
may be reasonable where a party imposes the restraint to protect his business have no application to this case. Defendant
itnposed no restraint. The plaintiff was not the territorial
agent nor in any sense the representative of defendant. Plaintiff had no authority over defendant. The restraint which
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plaintiff seeks to impose upon defendant retroactively certainly was not necessary to protect the business of defendant.
Plaintiff practiced deceit on both defendant and upon Utah
Hotel Company in an effort to prevent the hotel from getting
a bona fide bid from defendant. Plaintiff sought to deprive
the hotel of an honest bid by a responsible party and to
monopolize the bidding. Furthermore, whatever method of
doing business had been practiced in the past by the defendant
was not subject to the dictates of plaintiff as an occasional purchaser. The defendant alone had the right to change that
method and it did not have to consult the l?laintiff about it as
there was no existing contract with which such a change
could interfere.
Plaintiff cannot bring within any exception to the Sherman
Act its scheme to deprive Hotel Utah of its right as a customer
of defendant, to obtain a bona fide bid from defendant. Plaintiff was properly frustrated in it~ corrupt and vicious scheme
to deprive the hotel company of its rights as a property owner
to obtain a bona fide bid from defendant.

Point 3
THERE WAS NO LEGAL CONSIDERATION TO
SUPPORT AN (]MPLIED AGREEMENT" OF ANY KIND.
On page 36 of its brief respondent tries to create consideration out of negotiations which failed:
((Defendant does not recognize the time, effort and
expense occasioned on plaintiff's part in securing good
will, local contacts, copies of specifications, and esti-

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mations including the defendant's materials and relay
systems on a job ... ''
All of those acts were done for the benefit of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff certain!y does not claim to be indebted to defendant for the enormous expense which defendant ·was put
to in submitting to plaintiff scores of bids in utmost detail on
numerous projects during a period of 23 years which were
never accepted. After inducing the defendant to submit two
separate bids on the Continental Bank Building, which involved defendant in substantial expense, the plaintiff did not
even bother to submit a bid to the building management. To
quote further misstatements of plaintiff:
It was shown by a positive preponderance of
the evidence that the plaintiff constantly and without
exception attempted to convince the prospects of the
superior quality of the defendant's signal and relay
control system; that plaintiff did not seek quotations
on such systems from the defendant's competitors;
that the defendant knew plaintiff was dealing exclusively with the defendant in this regard; and that defendant knew plaintiff was estimating and including
defendant's equipment specifically in its quotations
to the customer or building owners . . . "
n

•••

The contention that plaintiff was ((constantly and without
exception" trying to convince the prospects of the ((superior
quality of the defendant's signal and relay 5=0ntrol system" is
utterly false, as demonstrated by the fact that in 1950 plaintiff
was not trying to get anyone to use defendant's relay control
systems. The plaintiff did not invite defendant to bid on such
systems, but invited Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company
to quote on controls on the Charleston Apartments, the Deseret
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News Building, Congress Hotel,

and University Heights

Apartments. The reverse of plaintiff's statement is true, for
in 1950 only on Hotel Utah did plaintiff ask defendant to
bid on controls, and that was due to the fact that the hotel had
indicated that it wanted bids on defendant's equipment. When
Kimball was informed by the hotel that the hotel wanted a bid
from defendant on the overall job, plaintiff tried to discourage
the hotel from getting a bid from defendant, and even recommended that Hotel Utah procure a bid from Westinghouse
which would not likely use any of defendant~ s equipment.
Such is an example of how plaintiff ({constantly and without
exception" tried to get defendant's materials used. A further
classic example relates to dumb-waiter elevators on which
plaintiff requested bids from defendant on many occasions,
yet without exception plaintiff purchased such equipment from
competitors of defendant (R. 480-482) . The contention that
plaintiff did not seek quotations on such equipment from
defendant's competitors and ((that the defendant knew plaintiff
was dealing exclusively with the defendant in this regard,"
completely defy the facts (R. 510-518). There were never any
exclusive dealings, and in 2 3 years the plaintiff accepted only
7 of the multitude of offers it procured from defendant. Cer-

tainly, there was no consideration furnished by failure to accept
numerous offers, and no contracts resulted from such unaccepted offers.
Plaintiff further indulges in patent misstatements of fact
on page 36:
Also there was certainly a promise from the
defendant to the plaintiff that when plaintiff requested
cc

•

•
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and secured a quotation on Elevator Supplies rnaterial
and thereafter based thereon made plaintiff's bid to
the customer including defendant's material, that de·
fendant would not bid direct! y to that customer . . ."
Defendant made no promise except what was detailed
specifically in writing in its bids. Those promises could not
become binding without acceptance. The subject of competition or refraining from competition never arose in any discussion. Plaintiff still insists that an unaccepted offer creates an
implied agreement on the part of the offeror to do something
or to refrain from doing something which was never the subject
of any negotiations. The following contention is likewise without substance:
There was also a promise running from the
plaintiff to use defendant's material since it was unequivocally established such was all plaintiff ever specified and estimated."
t t

•

An offeree promises nothing by merely receiving a bid.
Since there was no acceptance and consequently no contract,
there was no promise of any kind and no consideration. But
it is rather shocking to read statement after statement which
is utterly false. Plaintiff knows very well that it never at any
time purchased a dumb-waiter from defendant, notwithstanding
the many quotations thereon which plaintiff procured from
defendant. Such equipment was invariably purchased by plaintiff from companies other than defendant. Plaintiff knows
very well, too, that it never at any time purchased any control
equipment from defendant, but that it purchased control
equipment from Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company
(R. 480-482, 486, 510-518).
28
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On pages 37 and 38 plaintiff has the audacity to say:
Ct . . . The defendant company, after having associated with plaintiff for more than twenty-five years,
would now assert that the representation of the plaintiff and the close business association of the parties
was absolutely of no value."
What does plaintiff mean by saying defendant nassociated"
with plaintiff? The claim of nrepresentation" is entirely false.
Plaintiff now seeks to appoint itself nrepresentative" of defendant. How Ctclose business association" could there be in a
situation where plaintiff in 23 years induced defendant to submit offers on numerous jobs, but when awarded contracts plaintiff invariably failed to purchase anything from defendant
except in 6 specific instances? The preparation of bids over
a period of years, nearly all of which were unaccepted, constituted a liability, not an asset to defendant.
On page 38 the plaintiff continues to indU:lge 1n filSstatements, none of which show any consideration whatsoever.
The contention that ((it was of direct value to the defendant
to have its equipment quoted for sale," infers that plaintiff
was quoting to prospective customers on defendant's equipment when such was not the case. Likewise, there is no basis
to the assertion that nthere was an irrevocable commitment
made by the Kimball Elevator Company to the Elevator Supplies Company to purchase the material, if the plaintiff were
awarded a job." The contention is palpably false, since plaintiff
repeatedly obtained bids from defendant and then purchased
the same type of equipment from Pacific and from other companies. The concept that defendant might have obtained some
imaginary benefit from something complimentary which plain-
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tiff might have said on some occ~sion about defendant's
equipment, could not constitute any consideration nor create
a contract to refrain from submittipg a bid to anyone except
plaintiff in the future.
The entire argument that there was consideration for an
((implied agreement" which was supposed to have arisen out of
an unaccepted offer is absurd.

Point 4
PLAINTIFF RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT OF UTAH
HOTEL COMPANY TO OBTAIN A FIRM BID FROM
DEFENDANT.
There is no competent evidence of any agreement to refrain from submitting a bona fide bid to Utah Hotel Company.
The hotel having been a customer of defendant for more than
two years, any agreement between plaintiff and defendant
whereby defendant would refrain from giving the hotel a bona
fide bid would have been fraudulent and void.
On page 41 plaintiff says that any ({quotation by Elevator
Supplies could only be an estimate," which is not true. The
contention that the ((facts were on the table as far as plaintiff
and the hotel were concerned" is unfounded as far as plaintiff
is concerned. Nor were there any ((forthright statements to the
Hotel Utah by Connole," as alleged on page 42. Plaintiff
knew the hotel wanted a bid on the entire job from defendant.
Plaintiff sought to prevent submission of such bid in the first
instance by falsely representing to defendant that Kimball
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was going to be awarded the job, then by telling the hotel
building superintendent that it would do no good to ask
defendant for a bid (R. 523-524, 78~-787, 818).
The assertion that Mr. Henker was of the impression
that the hotel wanted a ((check bid or an estimate," and that
((any estimate given by them to the hotel would be so much
higher that necessarily the job would automatically go to
Kimball,' disregards the complete revision of Mr. Henker's
testimony on cross-examination when he stated that he came
to Salt Lake City for the purpose of making a detailed examination at the job site for the purpose of making a firm bid
to Elevator Supplies Co., Inc. (R. 676, 716-718). Plaintiff
tries to evade the admissions of plaintiff that Mr. Connole
told Mr. Henker that it was all right for Pacific to give defendant a bid, as plaintiff knew that defendant was bidding
on the job (R. 572-5 73). Pacific was plaintiff's principal, and
Pacific declined to give a firm quotation until it was assured
by plaintiff that it was all right to do so (R. 67 4) . The plaintiff
has nothing to complain about, for it recognized the right
of the hotel as the customer of defendant to obtain a bid
in good faith from defendant, and also the absolute right
of defendant to submit a firm bid.
The admissions of plaintiff shatter all pretense of some
((implied agreement not to compete." No such ((agreement"
could have existed at all, and certainly, no such ((agreement"
could have been implied in the face of the admissions of
plaintiff that it told Pacific it was all right to submit a bid
to defendant, when plaintiff knew such bid would be used in
defendant's bid to Utah Hotel Company.
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Point 5

THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF ANY
DAMAGES.
Plaintiff glosses over the fact that notwithstanding Mr.
Connole testified that the Kimball bid of August 16, 1950,
was supposed to cover the whole job, there were at least 15
items which had been omitted and that the costs which plaintiff omitted from its alleged nestimate" (which was prepared
after this suit was instituted), would have precluded the
possibility of any profit and would have resulted in a loss.
There is no basis in the record for the assertion that C!The
plaintiff invited the court and jury to scrutinize its books and
records." Exhibit SSS was prepared_ after this suit began. It
was wholly incompetent and prejudicial.
There is no factual basis for the assertion that Roy C.
Smith ((repeatedly indicated that the Kimall people knew their
· business."
There is no foundation for the assertion that Utah Hotel
Company would have allowed plaintiff to install its nameplates in the elevator cabs. In the first place, plaintiff precluded
itself from getting the job by its indisposition to submit a
satisfactory and complete bid. Furthermore, the management
of Hotel Utah would not allow name-plates except the name
of the cab manufacturer in small letters on the capacity plates
(R. 249, 259-260, 834-835). There was no competent evidence
that the hotel's consent could have been obtained. The owner
does not have to permit advertising.
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The cases cited by plaintiff on page 50 do not sustain the
position of the plaintiff that plaintiff could advertise itself as
the manufacturer when it manufactured none of the equipment. In no event could an installer advertise without the
consent of the owner, and there was no such consent. There
was no proof that plaintiff would have been awarded a contract, and no proof that it would have been allowed to install
any name-plates. Consequently there could have been no
damage.

Point 6
THE TRIAL WAS UNFAIR AND PREJUDICIAL TO
DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff Cloes not point out wherein a single error cited
by appellant was (Charmless" error. In the first place, the
trial court should have dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action. In the second place, the defendant was entitled to
a directed verdict of no cause of action. In the third place,
the trial court violated numerous rules of law and due process
at the trial. As pointed out in the Brief of Appellant, the
court proclaimed a fictitious ((preliminary contract of negotiations''-something alien to the law. The court permitted
plaintiff to introduce incompetent evidence. The court also
excluded evidence of the defendant. The court first ruled that
"Vvhether there had been exclusive dealings would be immaterial.
Then after it was stipulated that the dealings were not exclusive either on the part of plaintiff or of defendant, the court
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charged the jury that it could find an implied agreement not
to compete from nexclusive dealings." The court misdirected
the jury. The court refused to construe the written instruments,
and permitted the jury to find an implied contract from unaccepted offers and other negotiations which had terminated
unsuccessfully. The court refused to present defendant's theory
to the jury. Yet the plaintiff says that the trial was fair. The
record shrieks of prejudicial error. The trial court neglected to
cure the prejudicial error in denying defendant's motion for
judgment.

CONCLUSION
The Brief of Appellant points out numerous prejudicial
errors. The Brief of Respondent does not squarely controvert
the Brief of Appellant. Instead, respondent misstates the facts,
ignores the admissions of plaintiff, and distorts the written
instruments.
The plaintiff proved no agreement, since it admitted it
did not accept the offers it procured on the Hotel Utah in 1950.
This case arises out of the refusal of defendant as successful
bidder to pay a {(commission" to plaintiff as unsuccessful bidder.
No claim of any {(agreement" not to give Hotel Utah a bona fide
bid was made until after this action was instituted. The claims
of plaintiff are fictitious iQ. fact and in law.
There is no basis for the verdict nor for the adverse rulings
and judgment of the trial court. Defendant respectfully re34
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quests this Honorable Court to reverse the judgment in accordance with the request in the Brief of Appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL E. REIMANN
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
HOWARD ]. CANTUS
30 Church Street
New York City, New York

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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